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Summary
The success of Tanzania's structural reform efforts will (inter
alia) dep end on its ability to generate foreign exchange
incomes. Mineral exports seem a promising source of such
incomes. Tanzania is reportedly well endowed with minerals,
with considerable developments already under way to explore
them. Any attempt to make plans for the Tanzanian economy
must take this into account. The present paper, which is part
of the larger Macmod project, aims to make a contribution
towards this end. It seeks to assess the prospects for mining
developments in Tanzania during the next few years, and to
propose a set of quantitative estimates indicative of these
developments. In so doing the focus is limited to the standard
economic variables of production and investments.
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21 : Introduction
The success of the Tanzania structural reform policy wil ultimately dep end (inter aUa) on the
country's ability to eam foreign exchange incornes. Mineral exports are often considered a typi-
cal source of such incornes. This also seems apromising option in Tanzania's case: the country
is understood to be fairly well endowed in terms of gold and other types of mineral deposits.
Considerable developments, both in terms of prospecting and of productive investments, are re-
portedly under way, in order to explore these deposits.
Thus, according to the South Afrcan Deparent of Finance (see SADepFin/SADC): "Tanzania
is rich in mineral resources. Investment is, however, required to upgrade technology and renew
ageing plant and machinery.... Some analysts are predicting that Tanzania could become the third
biggest gold producer in Afrca, after Ghana and South Afrca. Other minerals include gem-
stones, coal, phosphates, iron, and to a lesser extent, tin, salt, gypsum and kaolin. Nickel deposits
have also recently attracted important new investment in the sector. "
Representatives of the Tanzanian governent have made similar claims. In a 1998-interview
with the South Afrcan newspaper Business Day the Tanzanian Deputy Mining Minister stated
that (see Dodd (1998)):
. Tanzania aimed to 1ift annual gold exports from the 1998-level ofapprox. 0,5 ton to 26 tons
by the year 2001 when there would be four or five gold mines in operations.
. Of nine major companies operating in Tanzania, seven were attacted by gold. Investment in
prospects nearing production would reach $360m over the period 1998-2000.
. Mining exploration, mainly gold related, had risen rapidly durng the period 1993-98 with
estimates of proven Tanzanian gold reserves at about 20-milion ounces and annual explora-
tion expenditure jumping to $80m.
. The embryonic mining sector, dominated by gold, accounted for about 2% of gross domestic
product (GDP) in 1998, but was expected to rise to between 10% and 15% within five years.
. Tanania is also a significant diamond producer, mostly via De Beers subsidiary, Wiliamson
Diamonds. After declining from 300 000 carats in the early 1980s to 68 000 carats in 1992,
production has shot up to 120 000 carats after rehabilitation of the mine.
The above statements give a definite impression ofhigh expectations. Ifproven right, they wil
obviously have significant positive impact on the economic situation ofthe countr. Vice versa,
a failure to meet these hopes wil evidently mean the loss of such an impact. Any attempt to for-
mulate forecasts or plans for the Tanzanian economy ought to take this into account.
Ideally, suchefforts ought to be based on "firm and realistic" predictions about the volume etc of
future mining activities. In practise, however, one must recognise the fact that the future is both
unkown and uncertain, and that this is also very much the case for the mining sector. The best
one can in practise hope to achieve is to base our efforts on "best guesses" or "considered opin-
ions" or similar.
The present paper, which is part ofthe Macmod project, aims to make a contribution towards
this end. It seeks to assess the prospects for mining developments in Tanzania during the next
few years, and to propose a set of quantitative estimates indicative of these developments. In so
3doing the focus is limited to the standard economic variables of production and investments.
This, of course, is not to deny that the development of the mining sector wil impact the nation in
a varety of ways, for instance with respect to environmental issues, land use issues etc. These,
however, are outside the lImited scope of the present paper.
2 : The setting
2,1: The mining sector during the 1990s
The aim ofthis paper is to assess developments in Tanzania's mining sector during the next few
years. Before doing so, however, it may be worthwhile to take a quick look at the setting for
these developments, i.e. at the existing situation in the sector, and the developments it has under-
gone during recent years.
Table 2,1 portays Tanzania's overall real-term GDP growth and the corresponding GDP growth
in mining. It is readily seen that mining and quaring has outgrown the rest of the economy
during the 1990s, and that it has done so both consistently and considerably. The growth rates
achieved in the mining sector are impressive by most standards, and especially so for the last two
years (1997 & 1998). The impression given by table 2,1 therefore talles with the bright pros-
pects for the sector indicated above.
Table 2,1 : Real-term growth in total national GDP, and in mining GDP
(TZS'mil. at constant 1992 prices)
Total GDP ofwhich: Mining
at factor cost Sector's GDP
Value Growth Value Growth
(TSZ'milL.) (%pa) (TSZ'milL.) (%pa)
1990 1 219236 NA 11 226 NA
1991 1 253 134 2,8 % 12 536 11,7 %
1992 1 275 917 1,8 % 13 503 7,7%
1993 1 281 006 0,4% 14 608 8,2 %
1994 1 298 942 1,4% 16 803 15,0 %
1995 1 345 246 3,6 % 18768 11,7 %
1996 1 401 711 4,2% 20 579 9,6%
1997 1 448214 3,3 % 24 097 17,1 %
1998 1 505 826 4,0% 30 700 27,4%
Source: BOT web site
Table 2,2 provides a slightly different picture ofthe mining sector. The table pictues Tanzania's
total GDP, and the share attrbuted by the mining sector. The brisk growth of the mining sector is
reflected in the fact that the sector has increased its percentage contrbutions to Tanzania's over-
all GDP fairlysteadily throughout most ofthe 1990s. Even so, the table makes it quite clear that
the mining sector has been, and stil is, a rather insignificant contributor to Tanzania's total eco-
nomic activity, accounting for no more than approx. 1 % ofTanania's overall GDP.
4Table 2,2: Total national GDP, and the part ofit attributed to min ing
(TZS'mil. at current prices)
Total GDP ofwhich: Mining
Year (factor cost) Mining as % of total
1 990 760005 6525 0,9 %
1 991 989 594 8840 0,9%
1 992 1275917 13 503 1,1 %
1993 1 607763 19 062 1,2 %
1 994 2 125 324 26 170 1,2%
1 995 2 796 642 35 190 1,3 %
1 996 3 452 558 38511 1,1 %
1 997 4281 600 53 515 . 1,2 %
1 998 5125311 74386 1,5 %
Source: BOT web site
Table 2,3 similarly portrays Tanania's total commodity exports, and the part ofit attrbuted to
mining. The latter is seen to account for a significantly higher share of exports than of GDP.
Mining is consequently one ofTanania's more export-oriented sectors. But even so, with ex-
port-shares mostly in the region of 5-10%, mining can hardly becounted among Tanzana's ma-
jor export eamers. Moreover, the export-share is seen to have declined significantly during the
1990s.
Table 2,3 : Total exports, and the part of it attributed to mining
(TZS'mil. at current prices)
Total ofwhich: Minerals
Year Exports Minerals in % of total
1 990 66561 3620 5,4%
1 991 75981 8479 11,2%
1992 123 966 12 920 10,4%
1 993 181 148 28 074 15,5 %
1994 265 177 15390 5,8%
1995 390 378 25 545 6,5 %
1 996 455419 31 450 6,9%
1 997 459 549 31 303 6,8%
1 998 391 805 17 509 4,5 %
Source: BOT web site
Table 2,4 ilustrates the commodity strcture of Tanzania's mineral export. The data cover the
period 1990-92 only, but are nevertheless suggestive of a general structure that seems valid even
today. Thus, as already indicated earlier:
. Precious rather than base minerals represent the backbone of Tanzania's mining exports,
and probably also of its mining production.
. Gold is by far the most important mineral produced.
5Table 2,4 : Mineral exports by commodity
Value (US$ 'milion) Percentage distrbution
1990 1991 1992 1990 1991 1992
Gold 13.6 29.1 40.4 51.8% 65.7% 76.0%
Diamonds 10.0 11.9 8.4 . 38.2% 27.0% 15.8%
Gemstones 1.6 1.7 3.2 6.1% 3.8% 6.0%
Salt 0.9 1.5 1.0 3.4% 3.4% 1.9%
All other 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.5% 0.1% 0.3%
Total 26.3 44.0 53.2 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Source: Nanyaro (1994)
Table 2,5 portrays the production ofprecious minerals during the period 1990-98. The table
gives an immediate impression of volatility; there are remarkably large variations in annual pro-
duction for each of these three commodities. The case is especially clear for gold, which grew
from 1.64 tons in 1990 to 4.53 tons in 1992, only to fall back to 0.23 tons in 1997.
Table 2,5 : Mineral Recoveries
Item Unit 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Diamond OOO'Carat 85. 100 67 41 26 50 127 123 95
Gold 000 'Kg 1.64 3.78 4.53 3.37 2.86 0.32 0.32 0.23 0.43
Gemstone OOO'Kg 38.7 59.6 48.9 33.0 48.5 111.4 137.2 124.6 48.5
Source: BOT web-site
The near collapse of gold mining may seem to refute the high hopes for the sector. Before draw-
ing such a conc1usion, however, a closer look into the background for these events is in order.
Doing so, it soon becomes clear that the developments depicted by table 2,5 must in large meas-
ure reflect the small-scale, "quasi-informal" nature of the Tanzanianmining industry.
During the 1990s Tanania had few if any operational mines of the type commonly found in
richer countries, i.e. large, capital intensive operations. The mining strcture of Tanania, in
contrast, has been one of "hundreds of small gold occurrences and deposits...operated by more
than 500,000 arisanal miners and a couple of semi-mechanized small companies" .1 The state-
owned Buckreef mine appears to have been the only large-scale gold mine in operation at the
dawn of the 1990s. When it closed down in 1990 it left "the country once again without a com-
mercial gold mine."(Nanyaro (1994)) 2
Mining in Tanzania during the 1990s may consequently be described as a small-scale labour in-
tensive activity. The sector consisted of a host of simple private-sector operations, simple in
technology and low in fixed investments. The mines were manned by an ary of workers, many
ofwhom may have tended to look upon mining as a seasonal occupation, or to migrate between
mining and other sectors in pursuit of an acceptable income. Richer prospects (relative to other
l Rough1y the same strcture app1ied for gemstone and diamond mining (according to Nanyaro 1994)
2 Another source of information on Afrcan affairs, the South African web-site: Mbendi, states that: "Most of Tanza-
nia's gold prospects are located in the greenstone belt south of Lake Victoria, where commercia1 mines operated in
the 1950s but later c10sed for economic reasons." (MBendi TzMine)
6low-skil altematives) may therefore have attracted a surge ofnew entrants into the sector (and
vice versa for poorer prospects).
This is apparently what happened in the early 1990s. As argued by Nanyaro (1994) the growth in
gold production resulted from the introduction of new mining policies, and competitive producer
prices. Thus:
. In May 1990 gold mining and selling activities were liberalised. As from that date, anyone
could sell gold to appointed bans, at competitive market prices, with no question asked.
. The Buckreefmine suspended operation in 1990, leaving the country without "commercial"
gold mining activity. Even so, gold production rose sharly, reaching an all time record of
4.5 tonnes in 1992. The dramatic rise was aresult of very active paricipation by artisanal
miners (very small-scale miners) who were motivated by the new liberal mining policy and
the good prices offered them.
The realities behind the dramatic decline in gold mining reported in recent years are not immedi-
ately obvious; neither the true extent nor the underlying reasons for the decline seems c1ear. Fo-
cusing on the first issue it may be noted that the veracity of the dramatic production decline de-
picted in table 2,5 may be subject to dispute. This is because these estimates, which we interpret
in terms of actual mineral extraction, do in fact record reported mineral sales. The latter may
differ considerably from the former if sales are under-reported (for tax reasons), production
smuggled in/out of the country (due to differences in local prices) or similar.
It is common knowledge that significant quantities of gold and precious stones have been smug-
gled out of Tanzania over the years. One observer (Chachage (1995)) even argues that large-
scale smuggling of gold occurred also during the early 1990s, i.e. when local gold sales were re-
cord high. The subsequent fall.in local gold sales may therefore reflect increased smuggling, at
least in par. The argument is lent some support by the Tanzanian authorities. Describing the
state of the Tanzanian mining industr in 1998 the Deputy Mining Minister maintained that:
"smuggling to Kenya by small-scale miners who currently dominate gold production accounted
for more than official exports" (Dodd (1998))
Even so it seems diffcult not to conclude that gold mining must have suffered a considerable
decline during recent years. The underlying reasons are not immediately obvious, but the fol-
lowing may be offered as a (partial) suggestion. "Pick and shovel" operations of the kind de-
scribed in the above wil typically have to limit their activity to the easy-to-extract surface-
deposits. The rewards reaped from such gold fields wil tend to decline after a while, and espe-
cially after a period of rapid excavation activity. Sooner or later the miners in question wil want
tomove on to richer fields. These, however, may be difficult to find, especially towards the end
of a "gold rush" era. The result may be a serious drop in production, as mine-hands move on to
other sectors in pursuit ofbetter incornes.
The industry wil consequently go into decline. This, however, may be no more than a temporary
occurence, lasting until fresh exploration areas are found. Even if such areas, suitable for today's
small-scale mines, should fail to materialise, however, other types ofmining are not necessarly
ruled out. The fact that Tanzania's traditional gold miners may have experienced hard times does
therefore not rule out the possibility that there may exist rich opportnities in mining zones left
7untouched by these miners. In Tanzania's case these zones may possibly include the greater part
of the countr's potential below-surface deposits.
2,2: Prospects for the future
In view of the above discussion it would therefore seem unwise to take the mining sector's per-
formance in the past as a guide to the future. Crucial policy changes, both in respect of mining
and other sectors, have been introduced to address the problems experienced in the past. Whle
the then economic regime tended to be stagnant and inward looking, the new policies endeavour
to turn the economy towards greater openness, both with respect to private enterprise and foreign
investments.
According to the Bank of Tanzania (BOT) these efforts are bearng frit: considerable amounts
of foreign investments are now directed towards Tanzania, indicating the renewed confidence of
the international business community in Tanzania's economic prospects. Thus, in its Anual Re-
port for the year ended 30.6.1999 the Bank reports that: "By end June 1999, there were 1,350
domestic and foreign investments worth more than USD 360.0 milion, licensed to undertake
mining and mineral activities in the country...." (BOT web site)
This development is also reflected in offcial UN statistics. A recently issued UNCTAD publica-
tion on Poreign Direct Investments (PDI) in Afrca (UNCTAD (1999a)) shows that Tanania has
recently become one ofthe continent's more prominent recipients ofPDI funds. Thus, Tanzania's
average inflow ofsuch funds amounted to 100 US$'milL. per year during the period1993-97 (ver-
sus 4 during 1988-92 and O during 1983-87). A faire share ofthese funds is presurnably directed
towards the mining sector.
Representatives of the international mining community are also on record with optimistic as-
sessments ofTanzania's mining potentiaL. In a recently published paper Dr Martineau, president
of SAMEX mining company, states that: "The Kukuluma deposit is one of several discoveries in
Tanzania which is likely to catapult Tanzania to second place in the league of Sub-Sharan Afr-
can producers. !ts development, planed for the year 2000, wil be assisted by the new mining
and fiscal codes being introduced this year by the Tanzanian Governent which set fair levels of
mining taxation and which draw on the experience of more forward Afrcan countries." (Mar-
tineau (1997))
A South Afrcan information site on Afrcan affairs makes statements of a similar nature. It as-
serts that "Tanzania is a key exploration area in Afrca.....with 20 milion ounces3 of gold having
been discovered in Tanzania in recent years." (MBendi TzMine) The same source states that
"The World Ban offers insurance cover for foreign investments in Tanania. These measures
have all assisted in attracting exploration capital to the country. Anual investments in mineral
exploration has increased from $US 0.5 milion less than 10 years ago to $US 150 milion."
In conclusion we.consequently accept the argument that there exist convincing evidence in sup-
port ofthe hopes for a better future for the Tananian mining industr, and especially for the
gold mining one. What remains to be done, then, is to translate these general expectations into
3 Corresponding to 567 metric tons.
8tangible numbers; i.e. into the type of concrete forecasts that are required for economic planing
and analysis (via the Macmod model).
3 : Towards concrete foreeasts
3,1: Searching for concrete project data
The present effort did not have the benefit of relevant, project-specific data supplied by the inter-
national mining companies concerned, or by the Tanzanian authorities. Instead we had to make
do with whatever information could be secured from open sources. A search for data was con-
ductedthrough the Internet. This resulted in the following "introductory" information:
. The BOT "Anual Report for the year ended 30.6.1999" identifies the following main mining
companies active in Tanzania:
By end June 1999, there were 1,350 domestic and foreign investments worth more than
USD 360.0 milion, licensed to undertake mining and mineral activities in the country.
They inc1ude Ashanti Goldfields of Ghana, Anglo-American of South Afrca, Reso-
lute/Samax Resources of the United Kingdom and Sutton Resources of Canada. Reso-
lute/Samax Resources project started production in November 1998. (BOT web site)
. In a 1998~interview with the South Afrcan newspaper Business Day the Tananian Deputy
Mining Minister stated that:
Tanania's first operational gold mine since independence from Britain in 1961 is ex-
pected to be a $50m joint venture between Australian company Resolute Mining and its
British partner, Samax Resources, at their prospect on the booming Lake Victoria gold
field..Production is expected to begin before December. Kahama Mining, a subsidiar of
Canada's Sutton Resources, plans to start production nearby in 1999, and has invested
$135m in mine development. Others to start production by 2000 include Australian-
owned Afrca Mashariki (East Afrca Gold) which has invested $75m in propert at
Tarime. Ghana's Ashanti Goldfields has invested $100m in its prospect. SAIS Randgold
Resources has a 1 ,5-milion ounce resource base at Shinyanga, while AustralIan mining
gi ant BHP Minerals is searching for base metals in Tanzania's far western Kigoma re-
gion. In the same region, Anglo American is on the prowl for nickel, cobalt, copper and
base metals.(Dodd (1998))
. The South Afrcan Department ofPinance has published some information on Poreign Direct
Investment in SADC countries, naming the following companies and mines:
Poreign direct investment into Tanzania has increased substantially over the past two
years. Most of the foreign direct investment into Tanzania flows into the mining and ex-
ploration sector - durng 1997, Tanzania received investments to the value ofUSD300m
in mining and exploration. The companies involved have included Sutton Resources
(Bulyanhulu), Pangea Goldfields of Canada and Randgold of South Afrca (Golden
Ridge in Sukualand), and Resolute of Australia and Samax Resources of Britain
(Golden Pride on Lake Victoria). (SADepPin/SADC web-site)
9The three sources of information are consequently not in full agreement; they specify somewhat
different lists of companies involved in mining in Tanzania. In total, we get the folÌowing list of
companies:
. Afrca Mashariki (East Afrca Gold)
. Anglo-:American
. Ashanti Goldfields
. BHP Minerals
. Pangea Goldfields
. Randgold Resources
. Resolute Mining
. Samax Resources
. Sutton Resources
An Internet search was made to obtain concrete information about the of investment projects of
these companies (and of the additional companiesSpinifex4, Iscor and JCI (Johanesburg Con-
solidated Ind.), which were subsequently identified.) The effort meet with little success; fewof
the companies in question appear to have publicised anything in the way of concrete project-
relevant web information of the kind required for our present purpose.
Some information was neverteless secured through this effort. Thus:
. Pangea describes the Tananian mining scene as follows:5 "In the nextseveral years, over
US$5006 milion wil be invested in Tanzanian gold mining ventues and five gold mines are
expected to come into production. These Tananian projects comprise the Golden Pride de-
posit (2.7 milion ounces), the Bulyanhulu deposit (8.8 milion ounces), the Geita Complex
12 milion ounces), the Golden Ridge deposit (1.6 milion ounces), the North Mara deposit
2.0 millon ounces) and the Kahama deposit (1.8 milion ounces)." (Pangea web-site)
. Resolute web-site describes the company's own operation as follows:7 "Resolute acquired
50% ofthe Golden Pride deposit from Samax Gold Inc late in 1996...... Late in 1998 Ashanti
Goldfields Company Limited acquired Samax Gold Inc, and with it, 50% of the Golden Pride
Gold Project. In July 1999, Resolute agreed to acquire the remaining 50% of the project from
Ashanti. Constrction of the project commenced in November 1997. ....the project was com-
pleted on budget (US$48milion) and first gold was poured on 10 November 1998. The
Golden Pride mine is expected to produce an average of 180,000 ounces of gold per anum
at a cash cost ofUS$200/oz." (Resolute web-site)
Additional data on the foreign involvement in Tanzania's mining sector was obtained from a
commercial South Afrcan data bank: BusinessMap SA. The information is summarsed in table
3,1.
4 Spinifex is probab1y the same company as the above mentioned Afrca Mashar (East Afrca Gold).
5 The text refers to total gold mining in general, not on1y to Pangea's part in it.
6 The corresponding figure given in Pangea's Annual Report for 1998 is 360. Unfortate1y, we have not been able
to establish whether the estImate of 500 reflects a misprint or more up-to-date information.
7 This quote may a1so serve to ilustrate a specific problem encountered when investigating the Tananian mining
ventures. It appears that a number ofprojects have had theIr ownership arangement etc changed over tie. As a
result, it becomes quite difficult to trace them correctly though the information flow.
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Table 3,1 : Foreign interest in Tanzanian mining ventures
Data Invest- Invest-
record Source Company Target company Status 8 ments ment
No. USD'mil. period
Buekreef 9
Expression
1 Spinifex Gold (Australia) of interest O 1998
Expression
2 Sutton Resourees (Canada) Bu1yanhu1u of interest O 1998
Reso1ute Ltd & Samex Gold New 1nvest-
3 (Australia) Golden Pride Mines ment 47 1997
Ang1o-Amerean Corp. (RSA), Kabanga Nieke1-Cobalt- Expression
4 Sutton Resourees (Canada) Su1phide Projeet of interest O 1998
Expression
5 Spinifex Gold (Australia) Kitongo of interest O 1998
Ang1o-Ameriean Corp. (RSA), 108+27
6 Sutton Resourees (Canada) Nicke1-Coba1t Projeet Intention =135 1997
Expression
7 Spinifex Gold (Australia) Nyakafuru of interest O 1998
Expression
8 Iseor (RSA) Pangea Go1dfie1ds (Tz) of interest 0.83 1996-98
Pangea Go1dfields, Golden New Invest-
9 Randgold Resourees (RSA) Ridge Mine Projeet ment 1 1995-98
Johanesburg Conso1idated Ind Expression
10 (RSA) Tanzanian Prospeets of interest O 1996
Expression 1998-
11 *) Sutton Resourees (Canada) Various mines of interest 350 2000
Ashanti Go1dfields Corp. Expression 1998-
12 *) (Ghana) Various mines of interest 350 2000
Reso1ute/Samex Resourees Expression 1998-.
13 *) (UK) Various mines of interest 350 2000
Source: BusinessMap SA
*) Note to data record 11-13: These records also state the that four international gold mining companies in
question (Samex, Sutton, Ashanti and Ang1o-American) are expected to invest $360 milions durg the period
1998-2000. The companies plan to operate at Geita in Mwanza; Kahama in Shinyanga; and Nzega in Tabora.
The companies began operations in 1992-94; the projects are now at advanced stage. Samax would sta pro-
ducing gold between October-December 1998; Sutton, operating under name Kahama Mining Corp, plans to
sta production late 1999. Ashanti and Anglo are to start production in 1999 or 2000. The four companies are
expected to produce 25t wort $250m per year, by the year 2000.
The records of table 3,1 are seen to leave out some of the mining companies mentioned earlier.
This may possibly reflect changes in ownership, name or similar, but the main reason is probably
that the table does not give a full coverage of all tentative mining ventues in Tanzania. Thus, it
seems likely that all already-decided projectsare covered, and most of the relatively-soon-to-be-
decided ones, while the further-into-the-future ones (i.e. those stil under prelIìninar investiga-
tion) are largely ignored.
The Mbendi web site (MBendi TzMine) tends to corroborate the list of companies given above.
It names quite a few companies that have demonstrated an interest in Tananian mining ventures,
8 It is a 1itt1e unclear exactly what "Expression of interest" imp1ies. It is assumed that the company in question has
stated its intention to undertke concrete investigation of given mineral sites.
9 This appears to be the former state-owned and -operated Buckreef mine. It is recalled that this mine was closed
down in 1990, closing the book on "commercial" gold mining in Tanzania (before recent events). It appears that the
mine may now possib1y be reopened under new management and ownership arangements.
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including one or two not mentioned by other sources. io It does not, however, provide much con-
crete data directly applicable to our present needs (i.e. project specific information about invest-
ment and production variables). Even SD, it does give the following additional information:
. Nickel Cobalt Mining: Sutton Resources and BHP Minerals are investigating the prospects of
potentially rich cobalt and nickel deposits at Kagera in Tanzania.
. Diamond mining: In 1994 De Beers increased its stake to 75% ofthe equity ofWiliamson
Diamond Mines as par ofthe governents privatisationinitiative. Operations were sus-
pended and the mine rehabilitated as a small mine. The mine resumed operation in 1996. A
fuher development was completed in 1997. Regrettably the high-grade diamond rich gravel
is almost depleted. The most one can hope for is that the operation repays its US$16 milion
loan in the agreed five year and that it operates with sufficient efficiency to produce some
return in the following two or three years.
. Coal mining: China wil supply equipment for the rehabilitation of the Kiwira coal mine.
This wil permit an annual production of 150 000 tons. USD 2 millon wil be spent on a
power unit, heating unt, turbines and a mineral treatment plant.
3,2: Analysing the available data
3.2.1: Information overlap
The concrete interpretation and aggregation of the above information is not an altogether
straightforward task. The data oftable 3,1 are the more concrete, comprehensive and relevant to
our task, but even so they are far from flawless. Thus, they serve to ilustrate the existence of
foreign companies' "expressions of interest" in Tanzanian mining ventues, but they do not, on
the whole, provide much concrete data about likely investment and production values.
There is also a definite risk of information overlap, i.e. that some projects/investments are co v-
ered by more than one data record. This is for instanee the case for record no. 11-13, all ofwhIch
refer to an investment ofUD$ 350 milion into "various mines". Obviously, these records all re-
fer to the same irivestment-aggregate, not to thee different aggregates each ofthis magnitude.
Moreover, it appears that par ofthe UD$ 350 milion investment is specified also among record
no.: 1-10, i.e. that the latter overlap with record no.: 11-13. Thus: the Resolute/Samex invest-
ments recorded under data record 3 are evidently par of the "joint" investment total recorded
under record 13. This is reasonably clear from the Martineau (1997) paper which states that
Samex is developing the followingtwo gold mines in Tanzania:
. Golden Price, which is covered by record 311 (and by record 13);
. Kukuluma, which appears uncovered by any of records 1_10.12
10 This is possibly because the companies in question are known under alternative names, or because they are fair1y
marginal actors on the Tananian scene, (for instance co-financing preliminary prospecting activities).
11 A comparison ofspecifics given for the Golden Pride mine in (Marineau (1997)) and the footnote to record 13
makes it clear that we are dea1ing with the same mine. Thus, both sources state that Samax wou1d start production at
this mine between October-December 1998.
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Other possible cases of overlapping concern data records 2 and 1113 (where, to be true, record 2
does not specify any investment sum), and data records 4 and 6.14 There may well be more cases
of double counting, but we are unable to pin them down. Portnately, our failure to detect all
such cases does not really matter because record no. 3 is in reality the only record of any genuine
concern (among record no.: 1-10).
This is because data records 11-13 deal with gold mining only, while record 3 is alone (among l-
i O) in specifying substantial investments into gold mining. True, record 6 does specify an even
larger investment, but not into gold mining. Records 8 and 9, on the other hand, which do specify
investment into gold mining, are both rather insignificant in size. The rest of the records do not
specify any concrete investment estimates at all, indicating instead that a potential interest has
been indicated for doing so later (subject to future investigation, prospecting etc.)
Translating such indications of interest into concrete estimates, representing future production
volumes, is no easy matter. In most cases we has no alternative but to rely on fairly loose guesses
and unsubstantiated presumptions. This is also true in the present case. Given this state of affairs,
the potential problem arising as aresult ofundetected double counting seems minute. We wil
therefore move on to the question of investment fallout without further deliberations in respect of
double counting.
3.2,2: Investment fallout
The data oftable 3,1 do not specify the dates to which the information refers. We do not know
when the information was collected, or whether it has recently been updated or reaffirmed. In
consequence, we cannot be entirely certain that the information given about the various invest-
ment projects are quite up to date. This may be a bit of a worr, given the possibility of cost
overrs and implementation delays.
Nor do the data of table 3,1 specify the date of decision making, i.e. it does not specify the data
on which the investing company decided to go ahead with a given project, as "described" in table
3,1. We can therefore not be sure that the various "expressions of interest" registered in table 3,1
stil remains valid. The possibility exists that they reflect "fundamentaIs" that have since wors-
12 The possibility exists that it may a1so be uncovered by record 13. However, Marineau states that the Kuku1uma
mine is situated at Geita in Mwana, which is one of the locations specified in the footnote to record 13. The Kuku-
1uma/Geita project consequently appears to be one of the "various mines" covered by record 13.
13 Thus, the footnote to record IL states that: "Sutton, operating under name Kahama Mining Corp, plans to start
production late 1999." From Mbendi TzMine we lear that: "Kahama Mining, a fully owned subsidiar ofSutton
Resources of Canada, is operator on Bulyanhu1u in the Lake Victoria Go1dfie1ds, which stas production in ear1y
1999 with a taget of 300,000 oz. per anum." Applying this information to record 2, where SuttonResources is
specified as the source company and Bu1yanu1u as the target, it is evident that records 2 and IL overlap.
14 In the latter case, however, it seems more 1ikely that although both data records refer to the same mine, they refer
to different stages ofmine expansion. Thus, the Mbendi web-site provides the following information about this proj-
ect: Ang10 American acquired a majority stae in Kabanga Nicke1 Company, which ho1ds the rights to the Kabanga
Nickel Cobalt Project, from Canadian company Sutton Resources. Ang10 American expects to contrbute $27 mil-
lion towards the development ofKabanga commencing with a programe of additional exploration drillng to be
comp1eted by 200 l. (N: It may be noted that the said US$ 27 milion may represent prospecting finance rather than
inveslments into processing capacity as such.)
13
ened significantly. An attempt should be made to assess this risk, focused on the sales-price of
the metal concerned (this presumably being one of the key "fundamentaIs").
Table 3,2: World market pricefor gold, nickel & cobalt 1516
Gold Nickel Cobalt NC-comp~
Period Price Index Price Index Price Index Price Index
1990 384 99 402 118
1991 362 93 370 109
1992 343 88 318 94
1993 360 99 241 71 15 63 36 63
1994 384 99 288 85 23 96 54 95
1995 384 99 373 110 29 121 68 120
1996 388 100 340 100 24 100 57 100
1997 331 88 314 92 24 100 57 99
1998 294 76 210 62 18 75 42 74
1999 279 72 273 80 15 64 36 64
2000 (Jan-Jun) 285 74 427 126
Sources: Varous, see footnote.
Table 3,2 depicts the movements of the gold price during the 1990s. The table shows that the
price of gold remained fairly stable, and high, prior to 1997. During the mid-1990s the price was
approx. 380-390 US$ per ounce. It subsequently fell to around 280 US$ per ounce in 1999, tak-
ing more than a quarter off the mid-1990s price.
A reduction in the gold price ofthis magnitude wil presurnably have negative implications for
the prospective investor's interest in investing in gold mining, and especially so ifthe depressed
price is expected to remain in force for an extended period. In the present case there may be rea-
sons to fear that the gold price may remain depressed for quite some time. Thus, the IMP and a
number of central bans, presently holding huge gold reserves, have indicated their intention to
sell off significant amounts of gold. It may therefore be a real possibility that the information
given in table 3,1 about gold mining interests are too optimistic given today's price realities.18
Looking a little fuher into this matter we returnto the data oftable 3,1. Although they do not
specify the date of theunderlying business decision, they do give the so called "investment year"
(and sometimes the "investment period"). The investment year given by the various records of
table 3,1 all fall within the period of 1995-98, and most fall within the period of 1997-98. Pre-
is The price for gold refers to US$ per ounce, for nickel US$ per metric ton, for cobalt US$ per pound, and for the
NC-composite US$ per kg. All indexes use the 1996 price as base.
16 The prices for gold and nickel for 1990-98 are from IMF's IFS series. The corresponding prices for 1999-2000 are
based on data from World Ban Pinsheets. The price data for cobalt for 1993-98 are crude approximations, based
on (UNCTAD (1999)). The corresponding estimate for 1998 is based on data from the London Meta1 Exchange
(htt://nicke1a10y.com ).17 Nickel-Coba1t-composite, calcu1ated by first translating the nicke1 and cobalt prices into kilo-term, and next cal-
culating the price of a "composite product" consisting of 12.5 kg of nickel and 1.0 kg of coba1t. The background for
these calcu1ations is exp1ained in the main text.
iS Thus: "The Tananian Chamber of Mines cautioned last year that the sector could be hur ifthe gold price contin-
ued to fall below $300/oz." (Dodd (1998)).
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surnably, these are the periods during which relevant physical activities are likely to be under-
taken. Le. the period in which:
. geological sureying and prospecting is supposed to be cared out in the case of the tenta-
tively interested ones;
. land clearing and site constrction is supposed to be carred out in the case of actually com-
mitted investors.
if so, the initial decision to enter into these activities must have been made quite a while earlier,
for instance during the period 1995/96-96/97. This means, inter aUa, that these decisions may
have been "flavoured" by the relatively high and stable gold price prevailing until1996. Ifthis is
indeed the case, the later fall in the gold price may possibly have dampened the enthusiasm of
some prospective investors. One may therefore suspect that some of the professed "expressions
of interest" wil fail to result in investments.19
It should be emphasised that the above argument relates to prospective investors, i.e. to investors
that are stil free to withdraw from the proposed project. The case is very different for investors
that have already committed their funds in Tanzania. They are in many ways "captured" by their
action, their funds having already been "sunk into the local ground". A price fall may mean that
they fail to ear a proper return on their investments, but even so they may be relied on to stay in
business as long as the price covers their recurrent operations costs. In all probability, the gold
prices quoted in table 3,2 are all well above this levei.2o
Moreover, it appears that the major gold investors may already have adjusted their price expec-
tations to the present relatively low level without stopping the project. Thus, it is recalled from
table 3,1 that the four companies in question "are expected to produce 25t worth $250m per year,
by the year 2000." Taking this to mean that the companies expect to produce 25 metric tons
worth 250 milion US$ per year, and using the conversion factor: 1 ounce = 28,35 gram, we find
that the impliedsales price is 283,50 US$ per ounce. This price is in line with the latest price
quoted in table 3,2. We wil therefore assurne that no major "investment fallout" has occurred.
Table 3,2 also depicts the movements of the nickel and cobalt prices. These are introduced in or-
der to help assess the viability ofthe two nickel-cobalt projects specified in table 3,1. An as-
sessment ofthese projects wil necessarily be crude, given that the nickel-cobalt mix of the mine-
product is unknown to us. However, it may be noted that the original BusinessMap information
about record no. 4 contained a footnote stating that preliminary resource calculations for a po-
tential future nickel-cobalt mine indicates a nickel grading of 1.5-2.4% and a cobalt grading of
0.11-0.18%. If this is representative alsoof the other mine (record no. 6) we are consequently
dealing with a "predominant" nickel-producer as seen in terms ofvolume, generating some 10-15
kg of nickel for each kg of cobalt. 21
19 Le. that fewer investment projects wil materialise than would otherwise have been the case. It is difficult to judge
how much of a problem this may be; much wil dep end on the investors expectations and strategy. Some investors
may have the luck to discover 10w cost/igh yielding mines that wil make a profit despite 10w gold prices. Also,
foreign mining companies may 100k furter ahead, hoping for better times in a few years' time, and deciding to get
estab1ished in Tanzania "ahead of the others".
20 Tlus, Marineau (1997) states that the operating costs of the Golden Pride mine wil be below 200 US$ per ounce.
21 A ratio of 12.5 to L is used in the calcu1ation of the composite nickel-cobalt price given in tab1e 3,2.
15
However, we know from table 3,2 that cobalt earns a much higher price than nickel. Thus, the
1996 (index base year) price ofnickel was 340 US$ per ton, i.e. 0.34 US$ per kg, while the price
of cobalt was 24 US$ per pound, corresponding to approx. 53 US$ per kg. The mine would con-
sequently eam around 150 times more from the sale of one kilo of cobalt, than it would from the
sale of a kilo ofnickel. Ifthis is accepted as representative of the impending mine (see record 6)
we are consequently dealing with a "predominant" cobalt-producer as seen in terms of price and
revenue.
The composite estimates indicate that the average nickel-cobalt price fell significantly after the
mid-1990s, from an index value of 100 in 1996 to 64 in 1999. However, the estimates also sug-
gest that the price grew significantly prior to 1995-96. All told, the price has probably fluctuated
considerably over the years, more so than for gold. The investors in question wil presurnably
have taken this market characteristic into account before reaching their decision. Despite the very
significant price fall recorded for 1999 we wil therefore assume no major "investment fallout"
also in this case?2
3.2.3: Guestimates
The hard facts at hand are too few to allow us to produce proper predictions depicting the devel-
opment of the Tananian mining industr during the years ahead. Despite major investment ac-
tivities already in progress much stil depends upon project decisions that has not yet been made,
or implemented. Instead we shall have to make do with guestimates, serving as tentative ilustra-
tions ofthese developments. The guestimates in question are detailed in table 3,3.
The guestimates oftable 3,3 are based on what the present author considers a likely interpreta-
tion of the available information. Other analysts may see these things differently, and wish to
revise the present estimates. Moreover, all guestimates are by their very nature subject to consid-
erable doubt and uncertainty. It is only to be expected that they may be subject to significant re-
visions as soon as new, more or better information becomes available.
In order to facilitate such revisions we shall specify the information and assumptions behind the
present guestimates in considerable detaiL. This is done in the following, where the various com-
ponents of the overall mining complex are discussed under five different headings.
A: Present (foreign) investments into gold mining
Varous sources of information agree that a group of some 4-5 foreign mining companies are at
present actively engaged in developing a range of gold mines in Tanzania. The total investments
involved appear to be in the region ofUS$ 360 mil. The exact number and identify of the com-
panies and mines involved is less clear, because the available information is a little confusing. 23
We wil therefore treat them as a whole, without trying to identify the individual units.
22 It may a1so be noted that the nickel price made a brisk recovery during the first half of year 2000, suggesting that
base metal prices may possibly be on the mend at the moment.
23 This may possibly result from a tendency for widespread cross-ownership and frequent changes of ownership
among the companies involved.
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Table 3,3 : Guestimates for the mining sector 24 (US$ 'mil at constant 1998 prices)
A: Total annual production
A,l: Gross Output (GO)
Period:
New/foreign ventures: Ref.: 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
- in gold mining A 3 27 77 175 241 259 259 259
- in Ni-Co-mining B 15 37 55 55 55 55 55 55
- in future mining D O O O 16 31 47 63 79
Total foreign 18 63 132 246 328 361 377 393
Local mining E 119 125 131 138 144 150 157 163
Overall total 138 188 263 383 472 512 534 556
A,2: Value Added (GDP)
Period:
New/foreign ventures: Ref.: 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
- in gold mining A 2 19 54 123 169 181 181 181
- in Ni-Co-mining B 10 26 39 39 39 39 39 39
- in future mining D O O O 11 22 33 44 55
Total foreign 12 44 92 172 229 253 264 275
Local mining E 100 105 110 116 121 126 131 137
Overall total Lo;) 112 149 202 288 350 379 395 412
B: Total annual investments
Gross Capital Formation
Period:
New/foreign ventures: Ref.: Pre 99 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
- in gold mining A 80 150 120 O O O O O
- in Ni-Co-mining B 110 9 9 9 O O O O
- in future mining D O O 27 27 27 27 27 27
Total foreign 190 159 156 36 27 27 27 27
Local mining E 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Overall total 162 160 40 31 31 31 31
The pertinent facts and assumptions conceming the investment projects ofthe group are as fol-
lows (ref.: records 11-13 oftable 3,1):
. The investment period quoted for these mines is 1998-2000. We accept this as the time hori-
zon for the main investment activities as such. The corresponding mining activities are pre-
sumed to follow gradually, reaching their full capacity in year 2003.
. The combined investment cost for these projects is estimated at US$ 360 mil. This total is
presurnably measured in expected 1998-2000 prices. We wil assume that the corresponding
total measured in constant 1998 prices is around US$ 350 milL.
. The total volurne ofproduction expected from these mines (after year 2000) is 25 tons per
year, at an estimated value ofUS$ 250 mil. per year. The implied gold price is consequently
283.5 US$ per ounce. This is slightly below the actual 1998 price of294 US$ per ounce (see
24 Note that these "estimates" do not claim to represent the "abso1ute trth" about futue mining deve10pments in
Tanzania. Rather, they are offered as a tentative iluslration ofthese developments.
25 The estimate of 112 for 1998 is adopted from tab1e 4,1.
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table 3,2). Converting the estimate into 1998 prices, we get a production (Gross Output) es-
timate ofUS$ 259 mil. per year. .
. The corresponding GDP estimate is US$ 169 milL. per year. This is calculated from the above
Gross Output estimate on the assumption that the GDP/GO ratio is 0.7.26
. Golden Pride is the first mine to come into operation. Investments started in J 997. Total in-
vestment costs are quoted at US$ 47 milL., presurnably measured at current prices. The corre-
sponding total measured in 1998 prices is probably US$ 48 milL.
. Golden Pride is supposed to be operative from late 1998. The expected production is 180,000
ounces of gold per year. The value of production at L 998 gold prices is US$ 53 milL.
. The implied Capital Output Ratio is approx. 0.9 for the Golden Pride mine, and approx. 1.5
for the rest of the groUp.27 We wil use the latter as a "guide" towards the construction of es-
timates also for mines outside this group.
B: Present (foreign) investment into Nickel-Cobalt mining
Anglo-American and Sutton Resources are reported to have made investments into a nickel-
cobalt mine. The pertinent facts about this venture are as follows (ref.: record 6 oftable 3,1):
. The investment period is quoted as 1997 and the investment costs as US$ 108 mil. The latter
is presurnably measured at current prices. The corresponding total measured in 1998 prices is
probably around US$ 110 milL.
. In addition a further US$ 27 milL. are spent on additional exploration drilling. It is assumed
that the corresponding 1998 value is ofthe same magntude, and that it is spent fairly evenly
over the period 1998-2001.
. The expected production (Gross Output) value is not specified in our data source. We wil
employ a crude "guestimate" ofUS$ 55 milion, based on an assumed Capital Output Ratio
of2.0.28
. The corresponding GDP estimate is US$ 36 milL. This is calculated from the above Gross
Output estimate on the assumption that the GDP/GO ratio is 0.7 (as in the above case).
. The start of actual mine production is not disclosed by our information. All we know is that
the investment activities were supposed to star in 1997, (and possibly also that they were
supposed to be completed within the same year). We wil assurne that some production ac-
tivity may have been initiated already in 1998 (and that this initial production may in fact
have contributed to the steep rise in mining GDP recorded for 1998 in table 2,1). We further
guess that full production capacity may be achieved by year 2000.
c: Investments into Pangea Goldfields
The South Afrcan companies Iscor and Randgold Resources are reported to have invested a total
ofUS$ 1.8 mil. in the Pangea Goldfields (ref.: records 8 and 9 oftable 3,1). It may be noted that
26 The GDP/GO ratio of 0.7 is based on a handful of corresponding coeffcients, representing 1arge-sca1e mining
operations in a few other Afrcan countries.
27 The Capital Output Ratio measures the ratio between the capital invested into a new venture, and the resulting
annua1 production-increase. In the present case this ratio is: 48/53 = 0.9 for the Golden Pride mine, and ((350-
48)/(259-53)) = 1.5 for the rest of the group.
28 The ratio of 2.0 is high1y tentative. It corresponds to the "benchmark" ratio of 1.5 (see section A), as adjusted for a
25% price-slump factor (1.5/(1-0.25) = 2.0). The price-slump factor represents the imp1ied 1998 "under-pricing" of
nickel-coba1t (as compared to the 1996-level, when the original investment decision was (presumably) made).
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Pangea is not listed among the "source companies" oftable 3,1, rather it appears as a "target
mine". In actual fact, however, Pangea is not amine as such but a mining company (i.e. it is a
source company according to the classification oftable 3,1). In all probability, therefore, the
fuds in question represent "portfolio" investments in par-ownership in already existing Pangea-
activities (as opposed to "real" investments in additional production capacity). We wil therefore
ignore these investment funds, presuming their "real-term counterpart" to be covered by project
included in section D below.
D: Other potential (foreign) investments
According to the information available it seems clear that interested companies are presently ex-
amining a number of potential mining projects. Whether or not they wil in fact go ahead with
them is stil an open question. Presurnably, much wil dep end on furter examination (test-
drillng etc) of the sites in question. It is consequently impossible, at this stage, to make any in-
formed estimates in respect of the number and character ofmining projects materialising from
these deliberations.
When studying scenarios involving such "unkowns" one may sometimes avoid the problem by
leaving the unkown variable out of the analysis. This produces a "parial/minimum" analysis of
sorts, which may often prove acceptable. In the present case, however, we are trying to guess at '
thefull rather than the minimum extent ofmining expansion in Tanzania. It would be inappropri-
ate to leave any relevant element out of such an analysis, even if we should fail to have all the
required information readily at hand.
Even though the concrete outcome of stil ongoing deliberations must necessarily remain in
doubt, it seems realistic to expect that some of them wil result in new mine investments. The
mere fact that numerous mining ventues (according to table 3,1 etc) are under active considera-
tion do es in itself serve to indicate the likelihood of such a development.
Moreover, the records ofinterest made in table 3,1 etc only cover sites for which preliminary
studies or similar are known to have been made. But the prospects for future mine developments
ought to be significantlylarger than those presently investigated. Tanzania is in many respect
"virgin terrtory", possessing numerous potential mining sites, many ofwhich have not yet been
properly examined. Presurnably, the international mining sector wil participate in the examina-
tion of these sites.
The case ofPangea Goldfields may serve to ilustrate the point. In Pangea's 1998 Anual Report
it states that: "Pangea's Lake Victoria Goldfields propertìes total an area of approximately 2,900
square kilometers ofmineral claims....These interests are held in 36 mineral concessions, two of
which are wholly owned by Pangea Minerals Limited ... and 34 ofwhich are held under joint-
venture agreements..." (Pangean web-site) Pangea alone has consequently secured a total 36
mining rights, a number far in excess ofthe few projects recorded above in table 3,1 etc. In all
probability, Tanzania's long-term mining potential is therefore considerably larger than revealed
by those data.
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The relevant question is consequently not so much if new mines29 wil come on stream, but how
many, when and where. We do not claim to have the answer to these questions. In table 3,3 we
have instead "solved" the problem by allowing the as yet unidentified mines ofthe years ahead to
be represented by a set of purely nominal figures. In the absence of concrete data for the projects
that are presently under active consideration, we have chosen to adopt the assumption that the
mines in question wil increase the total production (GO and GDP) in the "foreign" mining sector
by 25% by the end of year 2005.
Or expressed differently: we wil assurne that as yet uninitiated mining operations wil, by the
end of year 2005, produce ~ of the production expected from the mines already under constrc-
tion, i.e. from the mines discussed under sections A and B above. The corresponding investment
requirements are calculated on the assumption that the Capital Output Ratio is 1.75.30
The investments and production volumes thus calculated are introduced in a gradual and evenly
phased way in table 3,3. This trend-representation is a mere convenience. Thus, it may well be
argued that such a smooth trend must be an incorrect way of presenting developments that wil
arse in the form of "lumpy" and discrete events. In response we can but re-emphasise that these
results are not meant to provide proper predictions of actual events, but merely to ilustrate likely
or possible trend developments.
E: Local mining
The above discussed investment projects concern the activity offoreign companies. In this sec-
tion we shift the focus to Tanzania's own mining activities, i.e. artisanal gold mining etc. These
activities are quite diverse in nature, but relatively small in value (compared to the intended for-
eign ones). We wil therefore allow ourselves to join them together and treat them as one. The
combined sub-sector here discussed wil consequently embrace mining for gold and other pre-
cious minerals, but also stone quarring, coal and salt mining etc.
It is recalled from table 2,1 that the GDP statistics for the mining sector indicate that the sector
grew rapidly throughout the 1990s (see table 2,1). Except for the last year or two of the period
this growth may be attributed to local mining alone. Local mining, therefore, appears to have
grown by roughly 10 % pa (in constant price GDP terms), an impressive rate by most standards.
This rate, however, is probably a bit "deceptive". It probably does reflect the real expansion of
mine output in response to the new policies introduced by the Tanzanian authorities. But it
probably also reflects the increasing "legalisation" of already existing operations in response to
these policies. Presurnably, developments wil soon enter into a new and more "settled" phase,
which may be characterised by growth rates more modest in magnitude, but also more genuine in
nature.
Pollowing this line of argument we presume the local mining industry to remain capable of sig-
nificant growth also in the years ahead, but not to outgrow the rest of the economy to the same
29 Le. mines additiona1 to those discussed under earlier headings.
30 Note that we assume a Capital Output Ratio of 1.75, rather than the corresponding ratio of 1.5 applicab1e to the
"big four". This reflects the possibilty that future mining venlures may have to make do with mineral deposits
slightly poorer than those of the "big four".
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extent as it did during the 1990s. The GDP estimates for local mining employed in table 3,3 are
based on an assumed 5,0% pa real-term growth rate for year 1999 and 2000, subsequently re-
duced (evenly) to 4.0% pa by year 2005.31 The corresponding Gross Output estimates are calcu-
lated employing a GDP/GO ratio of 0.8432, while the corresponding investment requirements are
calculated using a Capital Output Ratio of 0.5. The latter reflects the assumption that this kind of
mining is very low in capital insensitivity.
4 : Concludin9 remarks
'Before ending this paper it may be useful to make a few brief references to some related topics.
The first concerns the question ofhow the mining guestimates translate into percentage contri-
butions to the nation's overall GDP, while the second concerns the issue of supplemèntary ac-
tivities.
4,1: Contribution to overall GDP
It is recalled from the above that the Tanzanian mining sector is expected by many to "take off'
in the years ahead. The Tanzanian authorities have consequently set their hopes on the sector in
their quest for economic development. Mining is counted on to contribute a rapidly growing
share of the nation's overall GDP. Thus, a governent offcial is even on record suggesting that
the mining sector may account for as much as 10-15% of national GDP by year 2003. Given pre-
sent realities, this seems quite unachievable. The guestimates of table 4,1 instead suggest that
mining may contribute around 4% of overall GDP in that year.
Table 4,1 : The growth ofmining GDP in total GDP (US$'mil., at constant 1998 prices)
1998~~ 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
A: Minint'l 112 146 196 275 334 361 377 392
B: Othet~ 7595 7899 8215 8544 8886 9241 9611 9995
c: Total 112 146 196 275 334 361 377 392
A in % of C 1,5% 1,8 % 2,3 % 3,1 % 3,6% 3,8% 3,8 % 3,8%
To be fair, the said suggestion was made some years ago (in April 1998, before investment ac-
tivities had stared in eamest), and it probably was offered more as a hopethan as a forecast.
Even so, it may serve as a waming, reminding us that it is all too easy to become euphoric when
dealing with potential "windfall projects". Experience show that even prornising prospecting re-
sults do not necessarily guarantee a speedy success.
31 This growth trend reflects the above "maturity" argument, but a1so the assumption that, growth in Tanania's econ-
omyas a who1e wil pick up. In response, less occasional1abour wil "seek refuge" in artisana1 mining. It also re-
flects the presumption that some of the countr's arisanal gold mines may be hurt by the entr of the international
mining companies. Neverle1ess, the majority ofloca1 mining activities are not presumed to be hurt.
32 The GDP/GO ratio of 
0.84 is adopted from the 1atest Input/Output table for Tanania. It represents the average for
the whole mining industr(as seen from tab1e 4,2).
33 Based on TZS estImates from tab1e 2,2, and an average TZS/US$ exchange rate of 665.
34 GuestImates (for 1999-2005) from table 3,3.
35 GuestImates (for 1999-2005) are based on the assumption that Other GDP grows by 4.0% pa (in real terms).
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4,2: Supplementary activities
An expansion of the mining sector along the lines suggested above may generate a number of
other activities, of a "supplementary" nature. These should not be ignored, if our concern is to
forecast the economic growth resulting from the developments in the mining sector, (as opposed
to focusing exclusively on developments within the mining sector itself, as narrowly defined).
Some such activities are briefly discussed in the below:
. Prospecting
. Investments into the construction of physical mining capacity do not normally repre-
sent the first activity undertaken for a new mining venture. The investment phase
must in most cases be preceded by a prospecting phase, the cost of which may be
very considerable. These costs represent economic production activities. Even so,
such productiondoes not necessarily add muchto the overall GDP of the country
concemed. This wil dep end on the "local content" of these activities; i.e. of the na-
tionality status (local or foreign) of the companies producing the prospecting services,
and the employment of local resources.
. The bulk of the prospecting services undertaken in Tanzania in the next few years
wil probably be undertaken by and for foreign mining companies. if so, they wil not
furnish too much ofa direct/immediate contribution to Tanzania's total GDP. Instead,
they wil typically represent services imported to, and subsequently "re-exported"
from, Tanzania.
. Construction
. Total investment costs may be broken down and grouped in various ways. In the pre-
sent case we wil focus on the following broad cost categories:
1. constrction work (earth-moving, construction ofbuildings, roads etc.)
2. machinery and equipment (excavators, crushers, dumpers, smelters etc.)
. Locally produced machinery and equipment for the kind ofmining projects envisaged
is unlikely to be available in Tanzania. Such cost components wil consequently tend
to translate fairly directly into commodity imports.
. Construction works, on the other hand, wil tend to generate demand directed at the
local constrction industry, i.e. it wil generate local GDP. This is probably true even
ifa large share ofthese activities should happen to be undertaken by international
construction companies, or by the foreign mining company itself.36
. Production inputs
. A significant expansion of Tanania's mine production implies a corresponding
growth in the sector's demand for production inputs. This extra demand rray be satis-
fied by increased supply of local goods and services, or by increased imports. In the
former case the growth ofthe mining sector generates (direct) growth-impulses
throughout the local economy; in the latter it does not.
36 Note that Standard National Account practise prescribe that the loca1 production activities of a constrction com-
pany or similar should be classified as 10cal, even when the cömpany concemed is 100% foreign. In other words:
constrctions can not be imported, only the services and equipment to build them.
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. In order to make proper forecasts in respect of the full economic implications of a
given mining project it is therefore essential to employ proper information on the cor-
responding input structure. This information may preferably be specified in terms of
Input/Output (lO) data that can be fitted into the Tananian io table.
. Tanzania is currently finalising the production of aneconomy-wide io table. Thus, it
should in principle be possible to undertake the kind on impact analysis mentioned
above. Before doing so, however, the problem of data-validity must be resolved.
. The problem arses because the average input strcture of the new mines is likely to
be quite different from that ofthe existing ones. The former wil tend to reflect fairly
large-scale and capital intensive mining operations, while the latter covers small-scale
and labour intensive ones. The present io table, of course, only reflects the existing
mine structure.
. The simple "pick and shovel" nature ofthe present industry suggests a fairly low reli-
ance on intermediate inputs. The present io table confirms this expectation. Thus, as
seen from table 4,2 intermediate inputs do on average account for a mere 16% of
Gross Output, out ofwhich very lIttle is imported. The new PDI driven mining ven-
tures, in contrast, wil typically require substantially more intermediates, ofwhich
much wil be imported (for instance fuel and spares required to run mechanised op-
erations).
. One may tr to get a little closer to the futue mining strcture by focusing on the
sector "other mining". As seen from table 4,2 (last column but one) this sector has an
intermediate input ratio of 25%, almost all of which originate from domestic sources.
Although probably c10ser to the "truth" , even this seems unlikely to provide a correct
picture of the input requirements of the futue mining industry. An effort should
therefore be made to obtain supplementary data in respect of the new input strctures
that wil present themselves in the years ahead. 37
Table 4,2 : The input-structure of the mining industry
Stone, Other min- Total min-
clay and Salt Gem-stones ing and ing and
sand quarmg quarring
Intermed. use - Domestic 18 % 20% Il % 24% 14%
Intermed. use - Imported 2% 1% 2% 2% 2%
Intermed. use -Total 20% 21 % 13 % 25% 16%
Total GDP (market price) 80% 79% 87% 75 % 84%
Gross Output 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Source: Draft IO-tab1e, provided by the Planing Commission.
37 In the first instance one may tr to obtain the relevant information from the companies concemed. Ifthis fails
(which it may well do) one may alternatively tr to constrct these data, emp10ying Input/Output data or simi1ar
from a countr with "reasonab1y similar" characteristics (in respect to the nature ofTanania's upcoming mining
strcture.)
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